Negligence - Last Clear Chance - Evidence Insufficient as a Matter of Law by Koerner, Theodore G.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 8 
1958 
Negligence - Last Clear Chance - Evidence Insufficient as a Matter 
of Law 
Theodore G. Koerner 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Theodore G. Koerner, Negligence - Last Clear Chance - Evidence Insufficient as a Matter of Law, 56 MICH. 
L. REV. 1358 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss8/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1358 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
NEGLIGENCE-LAsT CLEAR CHANCE-EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAw-Plaintiff, having fallen asleep at night -at the side of a narrow 
dirt road, was run over by defendant's automobile. He alleged that de-
fendant was negligent in operating a vehicle at an excessive speed without 
proper lights. Defendant pleaded that plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent by being asleep in the road, and plaintiff then replied that defendant 
had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. On appeal from a judgment 
of involuntary nonsuit, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. The plain-
tiff, by falling asleep at the side or in the middle of the road, was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law, and the evidence was insufficient to 
allow a jury to conclude that the defendant had an opportunity to avoid 
the accident after he discovered or should have discovered the plaintiff's 
perilous position. Barnes v. Horney, (N.C. 1958) 101 S.E. (2d) 315. 
The doctrine of last clear chance, as an antidote to the harsh rule 
that any negligence of plaintiff which contributes to his injury will bar 
his recovery, was first announced in the· famous "jackass case," Davies v. 
Mann.1 It is found to some extent in nearly all American jurisdictions,2 
and will no doubt continue until a better method is found to allocate 
the financial burden arising from negligence.3 There are four categories 
of cases wherein the doctrine has been applied which are distinguished 
1 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). 
2 Several states reject the last clear chance doctrine but may reach similar results 
in a given situation by holding that contributory negligence is not a bar if defendant 
acts willfully and wantonly or is grossly negligent after discovering the helpless plaintiff. 
See Bushman v. Calumet & S. C. Ry. Co., 214 Ill. App. 435 (1919); Kasanovich v. George, 
348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943); Switzer v. Detroit Investment Co., 188 Wis. 330, 206 
N.W. 407 (1925). 
3 See James, "Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine," 47 YALE L. J. 704 (1938); 
MacIntyre, "The Rationale of Last Clear Chance," 53 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1225 (1940). Great 
Britain and the Commonwealth nations have adopted comparative negligence legislation, 
and in this country Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin now have some 
form of general comparative negligence statute. In addition, the Federal Employers 
Liability Act, the Merchant Marine Act, and numerous state acts covering specific in-
dustries apportion damages on the basis of comparative negligence. See Prosser, "Com-
parative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953). 
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by whether the plaintiff is physically helpless or merely inattentive, and 
by whether the defendant has actually discovered the peril or should have 
discovered it had he been exercising due care.4 In the principal case the 
plaintiff by his own negligence had placed himself in a position of peril 
from which he was helpless to escape, and North Carolina is committed 
to the doctrine that if the defendant either discovered or in the exercise 
of due care should have discovered the plaintiff in such a position and 
subsequently failed to exercise due care to avoid the accident, the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence does not bar his recovery.I> Generally, the 
factual determination as to whether the defendant should have discovered 
the plaintiff's helpless situation, whether the defendant then had the 
means to avoid the accident, and whether the defendant then failed to 
use due care to do so, is left to the jury. It is only when reasonable minds 
could not differ that the court should make such a determination as a 
matter of law. Although the North Carolina court has often affirmed 
nonsuits or reversed judgments for plaintiffs based on last clear chance,6 
in this case it has gone very far in taking the case away from the jury 
when there was substantial evidence, as indicated in the dissenting 
opinion, 7 which the jury could have considered. This seems to indicate 
a judicial distrust of the jury in this type of case, perhaps based on the 
feeling that juries often decide cases and award damages on some rough 
formula of proportional fault, despite instructions to the contrary, or on 
the fact that the greater number of jury verdicts in negligence actions 
4 See 92 A.L.R. 47 (1934); 119 AL.R. 1041 (1939); 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947). Where 
plaintiff is physically helpless to escape the consequences of his own negligence, all states 
except the group mentioned in note 2, supra, will apply last clear chance if the peril is 
actually discovered, and probably a majority will also apply the doctrine if the peril 
should have been discovered by defendant in the exercise of due care. 2 HARPER AND 
JAMES, TORTS §22.12 (1956); 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §479 (1934). Prosser, however, states 
that the greater number of courts will deny recoverr if the peril is not actually discovered. 
PROSSER, ToRTS, 2d ed., 293 (1955). 
5 Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E. (2d) 337 (1945); Wade 
v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N.C. 524, 80 S.E. (2d) 150 (1954). 
6 The doctrine of last clear chance has not been applied where there were no known 
facts concerning the accident, other than that plaintiff was somehow injured by defend-
ant. Mercer v. Powell, 218 N.C. 642, 12 S.E. (2d) 227 (1940); Cummings v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., 217 N.C. 127, 6 S.E. (2d) 837 (1940). It has not been applied where the 
evidence showed that defendant could have had only a second or two to act. Van Dyke 
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N.C. 283, 10 S.E. (2d) 727 (1940); Matheny v. Central 
Motor Lines, 233 N.C. 673, 65 S,E. (2d) 361 (1951). In addition, where the evidence 
showed that plaintiff was not physically entrapped but only inattentive, last clear chance 
was not applied in Cox v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 210 S.C. 32, 41 S.E. (2d) 380 (1947); 
Dowdy v. Southern Ry. Co., 237 N.C. 519, 75 S.E. (2d) 639 (1953). 
7 This evidence included testimony of a supervisor of roads and a state highway 
patrolman as to visibility along the road; photographs of the accident scene; a surveyor's 
profile map; defendant's own admission that he was driving with his lights on dim 
(low beam); and a state statute which requires that automobile headlights produce suf-
ficient light to render a person 200 feet ahead clearly discernible. Principal case at 319. 
1360 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
are for the plaintiff.8 It may be that the court wishes to retreat some-
what from the far-reaching possibilities of recovery inherent in the "dis-
coverable peril" doctrine, but if so, this should be done explicitly. It 
seems clear that last clear chance, by placing all the financial burden on 
one of two partially negligent parties, is not the best solution to the 
problems arising from negligence actions. It is equally clear, however, 
that strict application of the contributory negligence rule is no better. 
The eventual solution will no doubt come in comparative negligence 
legislation, but until that occurs, last clear chance offers a makeshift solu-
tion, where, in certain types of cases, the jury can reach solutions which 
in the long run will be in accord with the wishes of the majority of the 
community. The courts should use restraint in taking these cases from 
the jury except in instances where there is no evidence of the actual 
circumstances of the accident; where it would have been physically im-
possible for the defendant to avoid the accident; or where some essential 
condition of the doctrine is not present.9 If there is substantial evidence on 
both sides, it would be better to let the defendant take his chances with 
the jury than to preclude the plaintiff from recovery as a matter of law. 
s See 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1257, 1261 (1956). 
9 See note 6 supra. 
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